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ABSTRACT
The easy availability of information on the internet has drastically
changed the way that lawyers conduct legal research and has also
affected the standards for competency to which lawyers are held This
Article explores the ways in which judges' and lawyers' expectations have
been shaped by technological changes in the last two decades. The Article
reviews the various ways in which the adequacy of a lawyer's research
can be measured and concludes that competence is measured both by
what techniques are standard in practice and by what sources judges look
to in supporting their decisions. Because many legal materials are
increasingly available only online, and because judges are showing a
greater willingness to rely on non-legal information available on the web,
the Article concludes that a lawyer cannot competently represent a client
without going beyond Westlaw and Lexis and conducting research on the
internet.
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Both attorneys have obviously entered into a secret pact-
complete with hats, handshakes and cryptic words to draft
their pleadings entirely in crayon on the back sides of
gravy-stained paper place mats, in the hope that the Court
would be so charmed by their child-like efforts that their
utter dearth of legal authorities in their briefing would go
unnoticed 1
INTRODUCTION
No lawyer wants to be the subject of public ridicule in a judicial
opinion, especially for something as basic as legal research. Yet in this
age of increasingly available information, many lawyers do find
themselves subject to public embarrassment or worse for failing to
adequately perform the building blocks of law practice-legal research
and analysis.2 How do lawyers find themselves in this position? And how
can they avoid it?
There is little question that locating relevant legal authority and
evaluating it are fundamental skills every lawyer should possess.3 The
American Bar Association has reflected this in the Model Rules of
1 Bradshaw v. Unity Marine Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 668, 670 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
2 See, e.g., Nagle v. Alspach, 8 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 1993) (imposing sanctions under
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 38 for a frivolous appeal due to carelessness
in research); Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 195 F. Supp. 2d 140, 184 (D.D.C. 2002)
("An attorney can not carry out the practice of law like an ostrich with her head in the
sand, ignoring her duty to research and acknowledge adverse precedent and law.");
Schutts v. Bently Nevada Corp., 966 F. Supp. 1549 (D. Nev. 1997) (imposing Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11 sanctions for failing to conduct "minimally reasonable
legal research"); TCW/Camil Holding L.L.C. v. Fox Horan & Camerini L.L.P. (In re
TCW/Camil Holding L.L.C.), 330 B.R. 117 (D. Del. 2005) (finding that an attorney can
be held liable for legal malpractice for failure to conduct adequate legal research); Blake
ex rel Blake v. National Casualty Co., 607 F. Supp. 189 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (imposing
sanctions under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11 for failure to conduct
reasonable research); Goebel v. Lauderdale, 214 Cal. App. 3d 1502, 1508 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989) (finding an attorney guilty of malpractice for "total failure to perform even the
most perfunctory research"); Walder v. State, 85 S.W.3d 824 (Tex. 2002) (requiring a
court-appointed counsel to file an amended brief for, among other things, inadequate
citation to relevant authority).
3 SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN
EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE
PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 138-40 (Robert MacCrate ed., 1992). The MacCrate
Report identifies legal research and analysis as two of the ten "fundamental lawyering
skills essential for competent representation." Id. at 138. Excerpts of the report are
available at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/publications/onlinepubs/maccrate.html (last
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Professional Conduct.4 Research is an essential part of any type of law
practice. In law schools across the country, students are instructed in the
fundamentals of legal research as a part of the required first-year
curriculum. 5 Research texts abound, focusing on the various sources of
primary and secondary legal authority and methodologies for accessing
the vast amounts of material available to legal researchers.
6
There is also general agreement that the availability of information
through electronic media has changed the landscape of legal research.7
The widespread use of Westlaw and Lexis has led to the expectation that
they will be used, at the very least, for updating and locating the most
recent authority. 8 A growing number of websites provide free and easy
access to voluminous amounts of legal authority.9 Courts and other
governmental entities are posting information directly to the web. 10 Judges
throughout the country are increasingly citing to information found on the
web. 11  Indeed, some scholars have speculated that the increased
availability of information on the internet is leading to a change in the
4 See infra Section II.A.
5 See ASSOCIATION OF LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS, LEGAL WRITING INSTITUTE, 2007
SURVEY RESULTS 7, 9 (2007), available at
http://alwd.org/surveys/survey results/2007_Survey Results.pdf (last visited Dec. 6
2007) (showing that of 177 law schools teaching legal research and writing in the first
year curriculum, 149 integrate legal research into the writing course).
6 See, e.g., ROBERT C. BERRING & ELIZABETH A. EDINGER, FINDING THE LAW (12th ed.
2005); CHRISTINA L. KUNZ ET AL., THE PROCESS OF LEGAL RESEARCH (5th ed. 2000);
ROY M. MERSKY & DONALD J. DUNN, FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL RESEARCH (8th ed.
2002); AMY E. SLOAN, BASIC LEGAL RESEARCH (2d ed. 2003).
7 See Lynn Foster & Bruce Kennedy, Technological Developments in Legal Research, 2
J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 275 (2000); Alvin M. Podboy, The Shifting Sands of Legal
Research: Power to the People, 31 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1167 (2000); Patrick W. Spangler,
The New World Versus the Old World ofLegal Research, 20-APR CBA Rec. 48 (2006).
' See Michael Whiteman, The Impact of the Internet and Other Electronic Sources on an
Attorney's Duty of Competence Under the Rules of Professional Conduct, 11 ALB. L.J.
SCI. & TECH. 89, 94 (2000) ("As judges become more and more familiar with using
computers and electronic research it seems reasonable to believe that they will expect the
same out of the attorneys that practice in their courtrooms.").
9 See e.g., FindLaw, http://www.findlaw.com (last visited Dec. 6, 2007); LawGuru,
http://www.lawguru.com (last visited Dec. 6, 2007); Nolo, http://www.nolo.com (last
visited Dec. 6, 2007); Refdesk.com, http://www.refdesk.com/factlaw.html (last visited
Dec. 6, 2007);
10 See infra Section III.B.
" Coleen M. Barger, On the Internet, Nobody Knows You're a Judge: Appellate Courts'
Use of Internet Materials, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 417 (2002). For a more detailed
discussion of the variety of sources courts are citing to the web, see infra Section I II.B.
4
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very nature of legal authority. 12  The rapid growth in citations to
controversial sources such as the unpublished opinions of courts,
Wikipedia, and legal blogs appears to support this contention.13
In spite of the widespread consensus on the importance of
research, 14 and the voluminous attention to how to do it well, there has
been relatively little analysis devoted to what courts mean when they
chastise a lawyer for inadequate research. How much research is enough?
How much support must a lawyer provide for a legal argument in order to
be minimally competent? Must a lawyer use particular methods of
research? Particular sources? As the nature of legal research and legal
authority changes, does the standard for competent research change along
with it?
This Article will attempt to answer some of these difficult
questions. Part I will review the various legal rules that address
inadequate research and the consequences for violating these rules. 15 Part
II will explore the standard by which competent research should be
measured, discuss how that standard should change with changes in
technology, and suggest that because of widespread citation to the internet
in judicial opinions and the way in which the nature of "legal" authority is
changing, web-based research for non-traditional sources of authority
should now be considered part of a lawyer's obligation of competent
research. The Conclusion will address the implications of these findings
for the future of legal research.
I. ASSESSING COMPETENT RESEARCH
Legal research is a process, but it is ultimately the result of that
process that reveals the degree to which the researcher has located relevant
12 See generally Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Nonlegal Information and the
Delegalization ofLaw, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 495 (2000).
13 See infra Section III.B.
14 For ease of discussion, the term "legal research" in this Article will focus on not only
locating relevant material, but evaluating and using it appropriately. When a lawyer is
criticized for poor research, it can be difficult to determine whether the problem is failure
to find a source, failure to understand it, or failure to use it properly. See Judith D.
Fischer, Bareheaded and Barefaced Counsel: Courts React to Unprofessionalism in
Lawyers' Papers, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1997). For purposes of this Article, the
term "legal research" refers to all three failures.
15 This Article will focus on research as reflected in written documents submitted to
courts. There are also cases in which the inadequate research of attorneys led to poor
advice given to clients. See, e.g., U.S. v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding
counsel ineffective for failing to advise his client that a criminal plea could result in
deportation when simple research would have revealed this). It is often difficult to assess
whether the failure to include a source in a document presented to a court is a failure to
find the source, or failure to recognize its importance. This Article will consider both of
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authority. Measuring the adequacy of legal research is thus a complex and
challenging enterprise. There is no one source that provides a clear
answer, though a variety of court rules and legal claims address aspects of
competent research. A review of these various sources reveals two
consistent themes in assessing the adequacy of legal research. Courts
investigating the adequacy of a lawyer's research look both at the process
and the results of the research. Thus, a competent legal researcher must
employ research techniques that are standard in the field, and the result of
that process must provide the decision-maker with adequate authority to
make an informed decision.
There are numerous ways to approach a standard for competence
in research. The most obvious indication of incompetent research is a
negative decision by a court that is as a result of poor research, rather than
the underlying merits of the issue. No lawyer wants to be in the position
of plaintiff's counsel in Brown v. Lincoln Towing Service,16 whose
complaint was dismissed because it was based on an expired statute. In
Bergquist v. FyBX,17 the court found that the case was properly dismissed,
even though Rule 11 sanctions were not warranted, where the complaint
"was the product of ineptitude and misguided legal research, rather than a
failure to attempt a reasonable inquiry into the law or an intent to
harass."' 
8
The appellate courts are particularly intolerant of briefs containing
arguments that are not clearly based on sound research. Both federal and
state courts simply refuse to consider issues that are not properly briefed.19
When a legal argument is inadequately supported by authority, it forces
the court into the role of an advocate creating legal arguments, rather than
an objective decision-maker evaluating the arguments presented by
counsel.2 0 As the First Circuit has said, "the reviewing court cannot be
16No. 88C0831, 1988 WL 93950 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
17 108 F. App'x 903 (5th Cir. 2004).
18 Id. at 905.
'9 See, e.g., Phillips v. Hillcrest Med. Ctr., 244 F.3d 790, 800 n.10 (10th Cir. 2001)
(holding that an appellate court need not consider an argument where the party has failed
to support it "with any authority, legal or otherwise"); Cooper v. Waters, 151 F. App'x
638, 639 n.2 (10th Cir. 2005) (refusing to review assertions raised by counsel "for which
he has not provided argument or legal authority"); John v. Barron, 897 F.2d 1387, 1393
(7th Cir. 1990) (dismissing an appeal where the brief failed to cite any authority); Smith
v. Town of Eaton, 910 F.2d 1469, 1471 (7th Cir. 1990) ("We recently have made it clear
that we shall not hesitate to dismiss an appeal due to poorly prepared and researched
briefs."); State v. Thomas, 981 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998) (declining to address an issue that
was inadequately briefed).
20 See, e.g., Ernst Haas Studio v. Palm Press, 164 F.3d 110, 112 (2d Cir. 1999)
("Appellant's Brief is at best an invitation to the court to scour the record, research any
legal theory that comes to mind, and serve generally as an advocate for appellant. We
decline the invitation."); Mantiply v. Mantiply, 951 So.2d 638, 653 (Ala. 2006) ("It is
6
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expected to 'do counsel's work, create the ossature for the argument, and
put flesh on its bones."' 21 Failure to research jurisdictional or procedural
rules can also result in dismissal and subject an attorney to public
embarrassment.
22
Even without concrete standards or sanctions, the negative
consequences of poor research alone should be enough to show a lawyer
why competent research is essential. These examples tend to show the
egregious cases, but do not clearly demonstrate a standard for sufficiency
in research. While no sources clearly and directly articulate a standard for
competence in research, a number of ethical and legal standards contribute
to a general understanding of the level of research it takes to avoid ethical
or legal sanctions and public embarrassment.
First, and most directly, the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct address competence in research.23 A number of the Model Rules
touch on aspects of legal research.24 In addition, both trial and appellate
court rules address the adequacy of research in documents submitted to
court.25 Finally, courts express their displeasure with inadequate research
through publicly chastising lawyers, 26 and clients express their displeasure
well settled that where an appellant fails to cite any authority for an argument, this Court
may affirm the judgment as to those issues, for it is neither this Court's duty nor its
function to perform all legal research for an appellant.") (citation omitted).
21 Redondo-Borges v. U.S. Dept. of Housing & Urban Dev., 421 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2005)
(quoting United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990)).
22 See Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Estrella, 390 F.3d 522, 524 (7th Cir.
2004) (dismissing an appeal where counsel "failed to do any research into the
requirements of federal appellate jurisdiction before filing this appeal" and asserting that
counsel for both appellant and appellee "deserve (and hereby receive) a public
chastisement").
23 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2007).
24 See Carol M. Bast & Susan W. Harrell, Ethical Obligations: Performing Adequate
Legal Research and Legal Writing, 29 NOVA L. REV. 49, 50 (2004). The majority of
states have adopted the Model Rules directly, and other states have provisions roughly
equivalent to the Model Rules. Id. For an alphabetical listing of all the states that have
adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, along with their respective dates of
adoption, see http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/alpha states.html (last visited Dec. 6,
2007).
25 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. I I (requiring that documents submitted to the court be
supported by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or
reversal of existing law); FED. R. APP. P. 28 (requiring that arguments in appellate briefs
be supported by citations to relevant authority). Most state courts have equivalent rules.
See e.g., FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-3.3; MASS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 3.3; OR. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3; PA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3.
26 See, e.g., Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 390 F.3d at 524 (scolding attorneys
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through malpractice actions. 27 While it is rare for an attorney to be
sanctioned for poor research alone, absent other serious problems, a
review of these rules and principles sheds significant light on expectations
for competent research.
A. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
28
The Model Rules include a number of provisions that touch on an
attorney's obligation to perform competent research. Taken together,
these rules create an ethical obligation to perform sufficient research to
effectively advocate on behalf of a client. Each state has its own
disciplinary system charged with enforcing these rules.29 The Rules create
a floor below which a lawyer may not fall without risking sanctions or
malpractice liability.
30
The very first substantive rule, Rule 1.1, provides, "A lawyer shall
provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation." 31 The comments to Rule 1.1
elaborate and clarify that "[c]ompetent handling of a particular matter
includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the
problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of
competent practitioners." 32  In addition, "[t]o maintain the requisite
knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law
and its practice .... 33 Model Rule 1.1 and its commentary are often cited
Unity Marine Corp., 147 F. Supp.2d 668, 670 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (criticizing counsel for
the poor quality of the briefs in a motion for summary judgment).
27 See, e.g., Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589 (Cal. 1975) (upholding malpractice verdict
where attorney failed to perform adequate research); In Re TCW/Camil Holding L.L.C.,
330 B.R. 117 (D. Del. 2005) (granting malpractice judgment for failure to conduct
adequate research).
2' The Model Rules of Professional Conduct were first adopted by the American Bar
Association in 1983, replacing the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. They were
amended in 2002. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Preface (2007) (describing the
history of the ABA's role in developing standards for legal ethics and professional
responsibility). The Model Rules and Preface are available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/mrpc toc.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2007). To date, the
Model Rules have been adopted by all but three states (California, Maine and New York).
ABA, Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/model rules.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2007).
29 Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Ending Illegitimate Advocacy: Reinvigorating Rule 11 Through
Enhancement of the Ethical Duty to Report, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1555, 1586 (2001).
30 [d
31 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2007).
32 Id. at cmt. 5.
8
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by scholars in support of the assertion that an attorney has an ethical duty
to perform adequate legal research.34 There is little clarity, however,
regarding how competency is to be measured under this rule.
35
While Model Rule 1.1 provides no general standard for what
constitutes competent research, it is clear that at least some research is
required when an attorney represents a client.36 Courts are clearly aware
of the duty of competent research and do not hesitate to refer attorneys for
bar discipline when it appears they have violated their ethical duty.37 The
duty of competence is only invoked in egregious cases, such as in Clement
v. Public Service Electric and Gas Co., where the attorney filed a civil
rights complaint based on a form book without reading the statute because
she claimed the annotated statute was too lengthy. 38 The court found the
attorney's failure to conduct independent legal research to show a
"shocking lack of diligence and incompetence. " 39 Finding the attorney's
3 Id. at 6.
34 Bast & Harold, supra note 24, at 50; Lawrence Duncan MacLachlan, Gandy Dancers
on the Web: How the Internet Has Raised the Bar on Lawyers' Professional
Responsibility to Research and Know the Law, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 607, 614 (2000)
("[T]he requirement of competency in the [Model Rules] is directly applicable to a
lawyer's legal research."); Whiteman, supra note 8, at 90 ("It has long been recognized
that the ability to perform adequate legal research is a component of Rule 1.1.").
3' Alexis Anderson, Arlene Kanter & Cindy Slane, Ethics in Externships: Confidentiality,
Conflicts, and Competence Issues in the Field and in the Classroom, 10 CLINICAL L.
REV. 473, 536-537 (noting that the comments to the Model Rules offer "limited
guidance" regarding research competence); see also LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G.
SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 214 (Aspen Publishers 2005).
36 Baldayaque v. United States, 338 F.3d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding grounds for
equitable tolling of a one year limitation where an attorney violated Rule 1.1 of the
Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct by failing to conduct any research).
31 See, e.g., John v. Barron, 897 F.2d 1387, 1394 (7th Cir. 1990) (referring an attorney to
a disciplinary committee in his home state for, inter alia, an inadequate brief relying on a
case that had been overruled and repeatedly rejected); SEC v. Suter, 832 F.2d 988, 991
(7th Cir. 1987) (referring an attorney's brief to the Illinois Registration and Disciplinary
Commission where the court doubted whether an attorney was "minimally competent");
Clement v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 198 F.R.D. 634, 635 (D.N.J. 2001) (referring the
case to the Office of Attorney Ethics to determine whether the attorney had violated Rule
1.1 of the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct); In re S.C., 138 Cal. App. 4th 396,
428 (Cal. App. 2006) (referring the case to the State Bar of California where the
appellant's brief contained incorrect citations, citations to irrelevant authority, and
assertions supported by no authority at all).
38 Clement, 198 F.R.D. at 636.
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excuse "simply mind-boggling," 40 the court required, as part of a Rule 11
sanction, 41 that she complete basic legal education courses.
42
When the duty of competence is invoked to identify inadequate
research, the court rarely specifies a standard for adequate research. In
one case, however, the court went so far as to spell out exactly what would
be expected in a brief. In Walder v. State,43 the court ordered a court-
appointed defense counsel to file an amended brief or face referral to the
state bar disciplinary committee because the lawyer's brief did not provide
"adequate citations to pertinent legal authorities." 44 Sadly, the court noted
that it received inadequate briefs with "disturbing frequency" and asserted
that an attorney had the same ethical duty to a client whether the attorney
was court-appointed or paid.45 The court went into great detail explaining
what level of citation would be adequate in a brief. The court specified
both the types of cases the attorney should have cited in the brief (e.g.,
relevant authority from controlling courts) and the methods the attorney
should have employed (e.g., research the subsequent history of any cited
46case). The court's expectation appeared to have been based on a
combination of what the court thought was sufficient support for the
argument, and the methods the court considered standard to locate those
sources.
The duty of competence provides the minimum threshold below
which a lawyer must not fall. Extensive research revealed no cases in
which a failure of competence based on research alone was found.
However, a failure of competent research is often discussed by the courts
in conjunction with other problems. Taken together with other ethical
obligations, a standard for adequate research begins to emerge.
40 id.
41 FED. R. Civ. P. 11. For further discussion of Rule 11 and its relationship to legal
research, see infra Subsection 11.B. 1.
42 Clement, 198 F.R.D. at 637.
43 85 S.W.3d 824 (Tex. App. 2002).
44 Id. at 826.
45 id.
46 d.at 827 ("When citing cases, counsel should identify and cite, at a minimum, pertinent
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, the Court of Criminal Appeals, of
this Court when available, and if no cases from this Court can be located on the issue
presented, of other Texas intermediate courts of appeals. Counsel need not cite more than
three cases on settled issues or principles. . . . Counsel should research the subsequent
history of any case cited to be sure that it has not been reversed or modified. When
counsel cites a decision of one of the fourteen intermediate courts of appeals, counsel
should provide a subsequent history on any petition for discretionary review or indicate
that no petition was filed." (internal footnotes and citations omitted)).
10
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In addition to the basic duty of competence, the ethical duty of
diligence also requires a certain level of legal research. Model Rule 1.3
requires that "[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client." 47  The comments explain that a
lawyer must "act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the
client." 48  Diligence is an implicit component of competent research
because, even if a lawyer understands how to conduct effective research, if
she does not do so, the result is no different (or worse) than if the research
was done poorly.
This Rule has particular applicability in cases where a lawyer has
done some research, but failed to perform a basic task, such as
Shepardizing. 49 A number of courts have faulted attorneys for failing to
Shepardize, either in print or, more recently, electronically. 50  Courts
routinely emphasize the relative ease and quickness of Shepardizing,
particularly with the use of Westlaw or Lexis, implying that failing to
perform this simple task is a basic lack of diligence.
A lack of diligence can also be cited in cases in which a lawyer
takes action without performing sufficient research. For example, in
Pravic v. U.S. Industries-Clearing,51 the defendant's attorney was
sanctioned for relying on a memorandum written by another attorney
without conducting any independent research. The court found that, at a
minimum, the attorney should have "independently verif[ied] the
reasoning of the cases cited in the memorandum and Shepardiz[ed] those
47 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2007).
48 Id. at cmt. 1.
49 For most of the twentieth century, Shepard's citator service was the industry standard,
and an essential part of the legal research process to verify that a found authority was still
a valid source of law. See Robert C. Bering, Legal Information and the Search for
Cognitive Authority, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1673, 1698 (2000). In recent years, Westlaw's
KeyCite service has proven to be a strong competitor. Id. at 1700. Judges and lawyers
continue to refer to "Shepardizing" to describe the process of updating a legal source.
'o See, e.g., Horaitis v. Mazur, 2004 WL 524437 at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2004) ("[I]f they did not
know better to begin with, they should have learned better by the simple act of
Shepardizing Geise (as every laywer should do before citing any case) .... "); DeMyrick
v. Guest Quarters Suite Hotels, 1997 WL 177838 at *1 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (noting that "no
counsel ought to cite a case ... without Shepardizing that case (or without conducting the
equivalent electronic search via Westlaw or Lexis)"); Cimino v. Yale Univ., 638 F. Supp.
952, 959 n.7 (D. Conn. 1986) ("Counsel is admonished that diligent research, which
includes Shepardizing cases, is a professional responsibility"); Gosnell v. Rentokil, 175
F.R.D. 508, 510 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1997) ("It is really inexcusable for any lawyer to fail, as a
matter of routine, to Shepardize all cited cases (a process that has been made much
simpler today than it was in the past, given the facility for doing so under Westlaw or
LEXIS.")); Meadowbrook LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 120 (Utah 1998) ("Shepardizing
a case is fundamental to legal research and can be completed in a matter of minutes.").
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cases." 52 Other courts have gone so far as to identify the ease with which
an uncited authority could have been found when other related cases had
already been cited.53 These examples, in which an attorney already had
the research that could have led to other sources, shows a basic lack of
diligence in conducting thorough legal research.
The duties of competence and diligence are both duties the lawyer
has to the client. The lawyer also has a duty to the court that is relevant to
legal research-the duty of candor. 54 Model Rule 3.3 provides in part that
a lawyer may not knowingly "fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority
in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to
the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel. 55 This
rule is designed to ensure that when lawyers are representing clients in
court, they preserve the integrity of the judicial system by not allowing the
court to be misled by a false understanding of the law or facts. 56 The duty
to disclose adverse authority is narrowly drawn, focusing only on
authority in the controlling jurisdiction that is intentionally withheld,57
however, it is frequently invoked when courts are displeased because the
lawyers haven't cited and argued the impact of important cases.58
While the duty to disclose adverse authority is aimed at ensuring
that an attorney does not intentionally mislead the court, it is frequently
invoked in cases where sloppy research, rather than intentional omission,
is the reason for a failure to cite a controlling case. It can be difficult to
determine whether a case has been omitted because of poor research or
intentional obfuscation. 59 From the court's perspective, the relevant
52 Id. at 623.
53 For example, in Salahuddin v. Coughlin, 999 F. Supp. 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), an
attorney failed to cite a key case, although other closely related cases had been cited. The
court pointed out that the key case could have been found by "Shepardization of LaReau,
a keynote search based on keynotes gleaned from the Second Circuit's Salahuddin
opinion, or any word search the Court can conceive that results in finding LaReau and
Smith." Id. at 540.
54 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2007).
55 id.
56 Id. cmt. 2.
57 Daisy Hurst Floyd, Candor Versus Advocacy: Courts' Use of Sanctions to Enforce the
Duty of Candor Towards the Tribunal, 29 GA. L. REV. 1035, 1039 (1995).
51 See, e.g., Cimino v. Yale Univ., 638 F. Supp. 952 (D. Conn. 1986); Glassalum Eng'g
Corp. v. Ontario LTD, 487 So.2d 87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
59 See, e.g., Cimino, 638 F. Supp. at 959 n.7 ("The court is unable to discern whether
sloppy research or warped advocacy tactics are responsible for these errors of omission..
• .,").
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authority has not been provided, and the court must at least consider
whether the omission has been intentional.
Ultimately, courts are more tolerant of unintentional failure to
disclose adverse authority, though they do not hesitate to express
displeasure at the poor quality of the research that led to the omission.
60
For example, in Glassalum Engineering Corp. v. Ontario, LTD, the court
roundly criticized both counsel for failing to cite the controlling case.
6 1
The court pointed out that the case relied on by appellee's counsel had
been superseded, which Shepardizing would have quickly revealed,
leading to the currently controlling case.62 Chastising the lawyers for "at
the least," performing inadequately, the court suggested that "[i]f either
counsel discovered but intentionally failed to disclose [the controlling
case], the implications would be far more severe: appellant's counsel
would be guilty of gross incompetence for failing to call our attention to
an obviously controlling case .... ,63
Perhaps because of the difficulty in determining when failure to
cite adverse authority is due to intentional deception, it is extremely rare
for Rule 3.3 to be the basis of a disciplinary action. 64 Courts are reluctant
to identify an ethical violation based on an assumption of wrongdoing. 65
Nonetheless, cases show that the courts have an expectation that thorough
legal research should reveal any controlling case, whether or not ethical
66sanctions will be imposed. For example, in Massey v. Prince George's
County,67 the court considered a violation of Model Rule 3.3 where the
defendants failed to cite an adverse case from the controlling appellate
court. The court saw the problem as a failure of research, and noted that
counsel should have been aware of the case. 68 The court even went so far
as to specify the search terms in Westlaw which would have led to the




63 Id. at 88 n.2.
64 Floyd, supra note 57, at 1044.
65 See, e.g., Geter v. Texas, 1996 WL 459767 at *3 n.2 (Tex. App. 1996) (stating that "we
have no reason to assume that counsel knowingly made a false statement of law and failed
to disclose controlling authority not disclosed by the State" but cautioning counsel "to
choose authorities more carefully in the future").
66 Floyd, supra note 57, at 1036-37.
67 918 F. Supp. 905 (D. Md. 1996).
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case. 69 However, the court ultimately did not impose sanctions, ruling that
the public airing of the problem in a published opinion should be sufficient
to emphasize the seriousness of the problem.70 Thus, even if fear of actual
sanctions does not motivate attorneys to conduct thorough research,
having their ethics called into question and being publicly scolded should.
Finally, Model Rule 3.1 has implications for performing legal
research. Rule 3.1 mandates that a lawyer should not bring a proceeding,
raise or controvert an issue "unless there is a basis in law or fact for doing
so . . ., which includes a good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law." 71  This rule bears a great
similarity to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and was
designed to address similar problems. 72  The comments clarify that
"[w]hat is required of lawyers... is that they inform themselves about...
the applicable law and determine that they can make good faith arguments
in support of their clients' positions."
73
Failure to perform adequate research prior to filing a claim can
result in bar discipline for a violation of Rule 3.1, often in conjunction
with violations of Rule 1.1. 74 Like the other ethical rules, violations of
Rule 3.1 are rarely based on poor research alone, and the courts do not
specifically identify a standard for adequacy in research beyond an
expectation that some research be done. In addition, cases imposing
sanctions under Rule 3.1 are relatively rare and focus primarily on cases
brought with an intention to harass.
75
Taken together, the ethical rules paint a picture of the level of
research an attorney is expected to perform. What all of the cases have in
common is a sense by the judge that the attorney has not provided the
court with what it needs to make an informed decision. However,
because these rules are enforced by state bar disciplinary organizations,
'9 Id. at 908 n.4.
7 0 [d. at 909.
71 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2007).
72 See Brown, supra note 29, at 158-88. For an interesting discussion of why Rule 3.1 and
Rule II are not used more synonymously, see Richard G. Johnson, Integrating Legal
Ethics & Professional Responsibility with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 37 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 819 (2004). For further discussion of Rule 11 and the standards therein, see
infra Subsection II.B. 1.
73 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 2.
74 See, e.g., In re Young, 639 S.E.2d 674 (S.C. 2007) (imposing a public reprimand and
costs on attorney for filing RICO claim without conducting any research in violation of
Rules 3.1 and 1.1); Att'y Grievance Comm'n v. Manger, 913 A.2d 1 (Md. 2006) (finding
violations of Rules 1.1 and 3.1, inter alia, where an attorney handled a custody dispute
without researching Maryland laws on custody).
75 Brown, supra note 29, at 1593.
14
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 10 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol10/iss1/3
10 YALE J. L. & TECH. 82 (2007)
the cases are not as widely publicized or as easily accessible as they would
be if they were reported opinions of a court. In addition, poor research
tends to be addressed only in the most egregious cases, and often in
combination with other ethical violations of a serious nature. The degree
to which the failure of research is a violation is sometimes difficult to
discern. As a result, the ethical rules do not alone provide lawyers with a
clear understanding of the expectation of competent research.76
Competence must mean more than not failing to make the most basic
mistakes. A clearer standard for competence in research can be found in
federal and state court rules addressing documents filed in court.
B. COURT RULES
The judicial system, in an effort to ensure the efficient
administration of justice, has promulgated several rules that address the
level of research expected by the courts. Primary among these are Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 28
and 38.77 The courts use these rules to sanction lawyers whose poor legal
research has resulted in sub-par pleadings and briefs submitted in court.
These rules, and the opinions implementing them, shed further light on the
standard for competence in research.
1. Rule 11
At the trial level, Rule 11 specifically addresses the adequacy of
legal research in pleadings or other filings to the court. It does so by
requiring the lawyer submitting the documents to certify that "the claims,
defenses, and other legal contentions [in the filing] are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new
law." 78  If the court finds that a lawyer has violated this rule, it may
impose sanctions. 79 The judiciary has not hesitated to use its sanctioning
power under Rule 11,80 and these cases reveal a great deal about the levelof research judges expect from the lawyers practicing before them.
76 For a general discussion of the current limitations of ethics rules as a way of enforcing
attorney conduct, see Johnson, supra note 72. Johnson suggests that the ethical standards
should be incorporated into Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in order to
create more uniform and effective enforcement of professional standards. Id. at 914-916.
77 All states also have rule-based or statutory equivalents to these federal rules, with very
similar standards. Marguerite L. Butler, Rule 1]-Sanctions and a Lawyer's Failure to
Conduct Competent Legal Research, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 681 (2001). For ease of
discussion, this Article will focus on the Federal Rules.
78 FED. R. Civ. P. 1 l(b)(2).
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By its own terms, Rule 11 requires an objective assessment to
determine whether an argument is based on adequate research. 81 The
Advisory Committee explicitly calls for an examination of "the extent to
which a litigant has researched the issues and found some support for its
theories even in minority opinions, in law review articles, or through
consultation with other attorneys." 82 In assessing whether there has been
an objectively reasonable inquiry into the law, courts consider whether a
reasonable attorney under the same circumstances would have drawn the
same conclusions about the merits of a claim.83  To make this
determination, courts first look at the kind and quality of research that the
lawyer engaged in before filing the lawsuit.
8 4
While many cases impose sanctions under Rule 11 for filings
based on inadequate research, few provide any concrete guidance for
measuring the reasonableness of the research. Many commentators have
pointed out that, in spite of the purported "objective" analysis, courts have
been unable to come up with a principled line for determining whether a
complaint is based on a frivolous claim. 85 This is largely as a result of the
courts' efforts to balance the goals of Rule 11 against the fear of chilling
legitimate claims. 86 This same indeterminacy exists in the courts'
assessment of the research underlying a claim. Thus, while the cases are
instructive in illustrating the kinds of research problems that lead to
sanctions, they do not provide a general standard for reasonableness.
The Federal Circuits have generally been vague in articulating a
standard for unreasonable research under Rule 11. The Third Circuit has
repeatedly held that, to comply with the Rule 11 standard, an attorney
must conduct "a normally competent level of research to support the
presentation." 87 The Ninth Circuit has similarly held that an attorney must
80 See Butler, supra note 77, at 683 (noting the trend toward increasing use of judicial
sanctions against lawyers and their clients).
81 FED. R. CiV. P. 1 l(b)-(c).
82 FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTES (1993).
8, Butler, supra note 77, at 689-90.
84 Id. at 701; see also Linda Ross Meyer, When Reasonable Minds Differ, 71 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1467, 1486 (1996) (discussing how courts have shifted from assessing the merits of
an argument to analyzing the research process in an attempt to objectively determine
when a claim is frivolous).
" Jules Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, 52 UCLA L. REV. 477, 521 (2004) (noting
the irony that the "objective reasonableness" test has made the current Rule 11 less
predictable than the "subjective bad faith" standard it replaced).
86 FED. R. CIV. P. I l(b)-(c); FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE NOTES (1993).
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"perform adequate legal research" prior to filing a claim in order to avoid
sanctions." These courts do not provide any definition of "normally
competent" or "adequate," leaving it to the individual cases to demonstrate
the expectations of adequate research.
The Seventh Circuit has been more detailed, articulating some
particular factors for consideration. 89 These include "the amount of time
the attorney had to prepare the document and research the relevant law;
whether the document contained a plausible view of the law; the
complexity of the legal questions involved; and whether the document was
a good faith effort to extend or modify the law." 90 While somewhat more
specific, these factors do not provide great clarity in terms of predicting
when research will be adequate. The Seventh Circuit has even gone so far
as to suggest that an objectively frivolous legal argument can give rise to
an inference that the signer did not conduct reasonable research. 91 Thus
the court is willing to presume inadequate research based on the merits of
the argument, rather than by looking specifically at the research
undertaken.
A number of cases identify specific research problems that can
lead to sanctions. One concrete reason given in the Rule 11 cases finding
inadequate research is the failure to Shepardize or otherwise update.
92
Failing to conduct any research or cite any authority in a filing is also a
87 Simmerman v. Corino, 27 F.3d 58, 62 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc.
v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 94 (3d Cir. 1988)); see also Brubaker Kitchens, Inc. v. Brown,
No. 05-6756, 2006 WL 3165010 (E.D. Pa. 2006); Harris v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 2005
WL 1899501 (E.D. Pa. 2005); In re Jazz Photo Corp., 312 B.R. 524, 536 (D.N.J. 2004).
88 Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Golden Eagle
Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986)).
89 Brown v. Fed'n of State Med. Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1435 (7th Cir. 1987), overruled on
other grounds, Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont'l Bank, N.A., 880 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1988);
Lopacich v. Falk, No. 92C 2339, 1994 WL 127257 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
9°d; see also Thomas v. Capital Sec. Services, Inc., 812 F. 2d 984 (5th Cir. 1987).
91 Mars Steel, 880 F.2d at 932.
92 See, e.g., Salahuddin v. Coughlin, 999 F. Supp. 526, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting that
Shepardizing would have led the defense counsel to a key case); Gosnell v. Rentokil, 175
F.R.D. 508, 510 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1997) ("it is ... inexcusable for any lawyer to fail . . . to
Shepardize all cited cases."); Brown v. Lincoln Towing Serv., No. 88C0831, 1988 WL
93950 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (imposing sanctions where the attorney filed a claim based on an
expired federal statute); Pravic v. U.S. Indus.-Clearing, 109 F.R.D. 620, 623 (E.D. Mich.
1986) (holding that the act of relying on another attorney's memorandum without
Shepardizing the cases cited warranted sanctions); Blake v. Nat'l Cas. Co., 607 F. Supp.
189, 191 (C.D. Ca. 1984) (noting that Shepardizing cases already cited would have led to
controlling authority). It is interesting to note that most of the failure to Shepardize cases
are older, suggesting that the ease of Shepardizing electronically on Lexis (or KeyCiting
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sanctionable offense. 93 In addition, courts impose sanctions where, in the
face of a clear line of authority, the attorney neither cites any adverse
authority nor makes an argument for the extension or modification of
existing law.94  Finally, citing cases that are inapposite can result in
sanctions. 95 In most of these cases, judges identify the failure of research
and impose sanctions without articulating a generally applicable standard.
For the most part, judges impose sanctions for inadequate research
based on the perception that the authority should have been known, or
could have been easily found through basic research techniques known to
all lawyers. 96 Many courts judge the reasonableness of the research by the
sufficiency of the argument, rather than looking at the research itself. If
the legal argument lacks merit, the court will presume that the attorney did
93 Butler, supra note 77, at 705; see also In re Young, 639 S.E.2d 674 (S.C. 2007)
(imposing sanctions under the state equivalent of Rule 11 for an attorney's failure to
conduct any research prior to filing RICO claim); Smith & Green Corp. v. Trustees of
Const. Indus. & Laborers Health & Welfare Trust, 244 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1108 (D. Nev.
2003) (imposing Rule 11 sanctions where an attorney filed a complaint "without
performing adequate research"); Clement v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 198 F.R.D. 634
(D.N.J. 2001) (imposing Rule 11 sanctions for a complaint based on a form book without
any additional research); Schutts v. Bentley Nev. Corps., 966 F. Supp. 1549, 1560 (D.
Nev. 1997) (imposing Rule I I sanctions where "Plaintiffs counsel simply could not be
bothered either to dig up any 'existing law' in support of Plaintiffs claim, or to make a
good faith argument for the law's reversal or modification").
94 Butler, supra note 77; see also Truesdell v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 209
F.R.D. 169, 177 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (imposing Rule 11 sanctions for failing to cite any
authority undermining a "clear line of cases" contrary to the position taken); Vazquez
Morales v. Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, 967 F. Supp. 672 (D.P.R. 1997)
(finding a violation of Rule 11 where the attorney failed to make non-frivolous arguments
for disregarding existing precedent finding defendant immune from suit under the
Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution); McGregor v. Bd. of County Comm'rs,
130 F.R.D. 464, 466 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (imposing sanctions where the attorney disregarded
controlling authority cited by the court in a previous order); Alison v. Dugan, 737 F.
Supp. 1043, 1051 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (imposing sanctions because "pretending that
potentially dispositive authority against one's position does not exist is as unprofessional
as it is pointless").
95 Butler, supra note 77; see also Zuk v. E. Pa. Psychiatric Inst. of the Med. College of
Pa., 103 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 1996) (affirming Rule 11 sanctions for an attorney's weak
grasp of copyright law and "a strained analysis of what appears to be an inapposite
case").
96 Salahuddin, 999 F. Supp. 526 (imposing sanctions where the attorney failed to cite key
cases that could have been found through other cases already cited); D'Orange v. Feeley,
877 F. Supp. 152, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding sanctions warranted where counsel did
not conduct "remotely reasonable" research, which would have revealed claim to be
meritless); Cont'l Air Lines Inc. v. Group Sys. Int'l Far East, 109 F.R.D. 594, 596 (C.D.
Cal. 1986) (finding a lack of reasonable inquiry into the law where the attorney did not
know of Supreme Court case decided four months earlier that had been widely reported
in the press and could have been easily found even without Lexis or Westlaw).
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not conduct reasonable research. 97 Ultimately, in deciding when research
has been sufficient to survive a request for sanctions under Rule 11, the
courts tend to approach the question in the same way the U.S. Supreme
Court defines obscenity-they know it when they see it.
98
2. Appellate Rules
In addition to the rules at the trial level, the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure and state equivalents provide courts with a vehicle to
penalize attorneys for inadequate research. Court rules, such as Rule 28 of
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, specifically require citation to
authority in the argument sections of appellate briefs.99 In addition,
appellate courts are explicitly authorized to impose sanctions for frivolous
appeals, including those that lack merit or are unsupported by legal
authority. 100 While appellate judges are not shy about expressing their
displeasure with poorly researched briefs, few cases articulate a clear
standard for competent research. Like the Rule 11 cases, judges seem to
base their decisions on their own expectations of the authority that should
have been provided. These cases do provide individual examples of the
level of research expected by the bench.
The basic requirement that the argument section of a brief be
supported by citation to relevant authority' °' seems so obvious it could go
without saying. In the federal courts, however, dismissals for failure to
comply with Rule 28 are not uncommon. 102 When an attorney fails to cite
any cases in a brief, it is difficult to know whether this is actually a failure
of research or can be attributed to other causes. Courts do not generally
take the extreme step of dismissing a meritorious argument unless it
appears that there was actual misconduct on the part of the attorney, rather
97 See, e.g., Matter of Ulmer, 19 F.3d 234, 235 (5th Cir. 1994) (affirming Rule 11
sanctions for failure to perform a reasonable inquiry into the law where attorney filed a
frivolous bankruptcy petition).
9' See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that,
while he could not define obscenity, "I know it when I see it").
99 See, e.g., FED. R. APp. P. 28(a)(9)(A); CAL. R. APp. P. 8.204; GA. CT. APp. R. 25; ME.
R. APp. P. 9; PA. R. APp. P. 2111.
100 FED. R. APp. P. 38.
101 FED. R. APP. P. 28(a).
102 See, e.g., Singh v. Gonzalez, 211 F. App'x 33 (2d Cir. 2007) (dismissing a case where
the brief did not contain a single authority); Armstrong v. City of North Las Vegas, 138
F. App'x 41 (9th Cir. 2005) (dismissing an appeal where the citations to authority were
"few and far between"); Heft v. Moore, 351 F.3d 278 (7th Cir. 2003) (waiving issues on
appeal where there was a failure to cite cases in support of the argument); John v. Barron,
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than mere incompetence. 10 3 Nonetheless, it is clear that failure to support
legal arguments with citation to relevant authority can have serious
consequences.
Likewise, state courts also encounter briefs that do not comply
with the basic requirements "with disturbing frequency."' 10 4 In Walder v.
State, the court was clearly disturbed by the lack of relevant authority in
the briefs. 10 5  The court also made clear that, even where there is no
immediately controlling authority, counsel should cite cases from other
jurisdictions. 10 6  While the court did not spell out specific research
techniques, it clearly expected counsel to conduct research in a way that
would yield authority for the arguments made.
In addition to risking dismissal, attorneys risk being assessed with
costs and damages under Rule 38 and state equivalents for poor research
resulting in frivolous appeals. 10 7 Appellate judges tend to avoid sanctions,
except in the most egregious cases. 108 In addition, the federal circuits do
not take a uniform approach to imposing sanctions under Rule 38,
particularly in terms of whether the appeal needs to be non-meritorious in
order to warrant sanctions. 10 9 Nonetheless, courts have made clear that
they expect attorneys to conduct diligent research before filing appeals. 110
Often, attorneys are personally liable and cannot charge the client for
sanctions imposed under Rule 38.111
103 Pena-Torres v. Gonzales, 128 F. App'x 628, 630 (9th Cir. 2005).
104 Cowan v. Wilson, 85 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Civ. App. 2002); see also State v.
Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) (declining to address an issue where the brief
was so inadequate that it "shift[ed] the burden of research ... to the reviewing court").
105 85 S.W.3d 824, 828 (Tex. App. 2002).
106 Id. at 828 n.4.
107 FED. R. APP. P. 38 (authorizing the court to assess damages and single or double costs
against an appellee in frivolous appeal).
10' Mark R. Kravitz, Unpleasant Duties: Imposing Sanctions for Frivolous Appeals, 4 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROC. 335, 335-36 (2002).
109 Scott A. Martin, Note, Keeping Courts Afloat in a Rising Sea of Litigation: An
Objective Approach to Imposing Rule 38 Sanctions for Frivolous Appeals, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 1156, 1159 (2002).
110 See, e.g., Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Estrella, 390 F.3d 522, 524 (7th
Cir. 2004) (chastising the attorney for failing to research appellate jurisdiction before
filing an appeal); In re Maurice, 73 F.3d 124, 128 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Counsel must do the
research and restrict their arguments to those with some support."); Nagle v. Alspach, 8
F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing attorneys' affirmative obligation to research the
law); Transnational Corp. v. Rodio & Ursillo, Ltd., 920 F.2d 1066, 1072 (lst Cir. 1990)
(imposing sanctions for appeal brought without even minimal research).
I Kravitz, supra note 108, at 340.
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Like the Rule 11 cases, the Rule 38 cases do not articulate a
specific standard for research. Some courts, using an objective standard,
find that sanctions are warranted where, "following ... careful research of
the law, a reasonable attorney would conclude that the appeal is
frivolous." 112  As with the ethical rules and trial court rules, the standard
"careful" is not specifically defined. Instead, courts condemn specific
practices such as misquoting precedent, 113 failing to cite clearly
controlling authority, 114 and citing irrelevant authority. 115 The appellate
courts are particularly concerned with being provided with the authority
they need in order to make a decision. Rule 38 costs and attorneys' fees
are most readily assessed when the court has been put in the position of
conducting its own research to determine the merits of the appeal. 116
None of the cases identify specific research techniques, though if
the court is using a "reasonable attorney" standard, it presumes that
counsel should have used those techniques and research methods that are
standard practice. Since the court measures reasonableness by considering
what other attorneys in a similar position would do, it follows that the
research techniques employed by the majority of lawyers are those that are
standard in practice, and thus set the bar for reasonableness. The
collective message from the cases is that judges expect to be provided with
the authority they need to render a decision, and that they expect the
"reasonable attorney" to find that authority using standard research
techniques.
C. MALPRACTICE AND INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
In addition to bar discipline and court sanctions, courts are called
on to assess the effectiveness of lawyers' research at the request of clients
in malpractice claims and requests for post-conviction relief due to
ineffective assistance of counsel. While the bar and bench may be
reluctant to discipline lawyers for incompetent research, clients show no
112 Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 943 F.2d 346, 347 (3d Cir. 1991); see also Nagle, 8 F.3d at
145. There is some disagreement among the circuits as to whether the standard under
Rule 38 should be objective or require subjective bad faith on the part of counsel. See
Martin, supra note 109, at 1159. Obviously, those circuits requiring bad faith would not
impose sanctions for poor research alone.
113 McCandless v. Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co., 697 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1983).
114 See Pierotti v. Torian, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 553, 563 (Ct. App. 2000) (imposing sanctions
for a frivolous claim for "counsel's utter failure to discuss the most pertinent legal
authority").
115 SEC v. Suter, 832 F.2d 988, 991 (7th Cir. 1987).
116 See, e.g., Ernst Haas Studio v. Palm Press, 164 F.3d 110, 112 (2d Cir. 1999); John v.
Barron, 897 F.2d 1387, 1393 (7th Cir. 1990) (asserting that the "court is not obligated to
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such compunction." 7 Lawyers' poor research skills are often called on the
carpet in these cases, which provide good insight into the expectations of
competency in legal research.
Legal malpractice is generally analyzed as a negligence claim,
requiring a duty, breach, causation and damages. 118 As a result of the
fiduciary relationship between lawyer and client, the lawyer owes a duty
of competent representation to the client. 119  The duty of competent
representation includes an obligation to know and to research the law.
120
Inadequate research can be the basis of a breach of that duty. 
121
In fulfilling the duty of competent research, the lawyer is expected
to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances. 122 A lawyer breaches
this duty "if he or she fails to possess and exercise that degree of
knowledge, skill and care which would normally be exercised by members
of the profession under the same or similar circumstances."' 123 As in other
professional malpractice cases, courts will usually require expert
testimony to establish what members of the profession would ordinarily
do. 124
Similarly, in cases for post-conviction relief based on ineffective
assistance of counsel, courts assess the competence of lawyers in
representing their clients. 125 Under Strickland v. Washington,126 the first
117 See Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: Reforming Lawyers and Law Professors,
70 TUL. L. REV. 2583, 2601 (1996) (arguing that legal malpractice is the predominant
way in which lawyers are regulated).
1is 2 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 14:2 (2007 ed.).
119 Id. § 14:1.
120 Id. § 18:6.
121 See, e.g., Smith v. Lewis, 520 P.2d 589, 595 (Cal. App. 1975), overruled on other
grounds, In re Marriage of Brown, 544 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1976); see also In re TCW/Camil
Holding L.L.C., 330 B.R. 117 (D. Del. 2005) (holding an attorney liable for failing to
conduct adequate research); Shopsin v. Siben & Siben, 268 A.D.2d 578, 578 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2000) ("'An attorney may be liable for . . .his failure to conduct adequate legal
research."' (quoting McCoy v. Tepper, 261 A.D.2d 592, 593 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)));
Collas v. Garnick, 624 A.2d 117, 120 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) ("Although a lawyer is not
expected to be infallible, he or she is expected to conduct that measure of research
sufficient to allow the client to make an informed decision.").
122  MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 118, § 18:6.
123 Fiorentino v. Rapoport, 693 A.2d 208, 210 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); see also 2 MALLEN
& SMITH, supra note 118, § 19.3 (explaining the parameters of competence across
jurisdictions).
124  MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 118, § 32.162.
125 Meredith J. Duncan, The (So-Called) Liability of Criminal Defense Attorneys: A
System in Need of Reform, 2002 BYU L. REV. 1, 12-13.
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prong of an ineffective assistance claim is whether the lawyer's
performance was "deficient."' 127 Deficiency is assessed based on what is
reasonable "under prevailing professional norms."' 128  Courts treat this
standard interchangeably with the standard of ordinary care in malpractice
cases. 129
In the context of both malpractice and ineffective assistance cases,
the courts have had many opportunities to consider the adequacy of the
lawyers' research. The most oft-repeated standard for reasonable care in
terms of legal research was articulated by the California Supreme Court in
Smith v. Lewis. 130 In Smith, the plaintiff sued her divorce attorney for
malpractice for failing to include her husband's retirement benefits as
community property. 131 The defendant claimed that since the community
property status of retirement benefits was unsettled, he should not be liable
for malpractice even though he relied on his general knowledge of the
field and did not specifically research the issue. 132 The court disagreed.
The court found that, while an attorney is not liable for every
mistake, he "is expected ... to possess knowledge of those plain and
elementary principles of law which are commonly known by well
informed attorneys, and to discover those additional rules of law which,
although not commonly known, may readily be found by standard
research techniques."' 133  In a move that is unusual in the inadequate
research cases, the court actually presented some detail about the
"standard research techniques" that could have been used by the
defendant. The court referred to "the major authoritative reference works
that attorneys routinely consult for a brief and reliable exposition of the
law,' 134 including legal encyclopedias and hornbooks, and discussed these
sources' impact on the question of whether the relevant legal questions
were unsettled.13
5
12' 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
127 Id. at 687.
128 Id. at 688.
129 See MacLachlan, supra note 34, at 619 n.74.
130 530 P.2d 589 (Cal. 1975), overruled on other grounds, In re Marriage of Brown, 544
P.2d 561 (Cal. 1976).
131 Id.
132 Id. at 592.
133 Id. at 595.
134 Id. at 593.
135 Id. The specific sources listed by the court were the American Law Reports (A.L.R.),
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In addition, though Smith did not ultimately find the law to be
unsettled in the case at bar, the court stated that even when the law is
unsettled, "an attorney assumes an obligation to his client to undertake
reasonable research in an effort to ascertain relevant legal principles and to
make an informed decision."' 136 Many jurisdictions have followed suit in
requiring attorneys to prove that they engaged in reasonable research to
avoid liability in cases where the law was unsettled and they turned out to
be wrong.137 The decision about when research has been reasonable is a
question of the fact, generally established by an attorney expert assessing
the adequacy of the attorney-defendant's research.1
38
The most important factor in these cases is that the attorney has
conducted sufficient research to make an informed decision, even if that
decision is ultimately proven wrong and the attorney does not achieve a
successful result for the client. Thus, while an attorney who makes an
incorrect judgment following reasonable research will not be liable for
malpractice, an attorney who is correct in spite of having conducted no
research on an issue can be. 139 While these cases make clear that at least
some research must be done, the gap between no research and reasonable
research is not clearly defined.
In assessing the adequacy of the research in malpractice and
ineffective assistance cases, courts have considered a variety of research
issues. Lawyers are expected to engage in research to stay current in the
areas of law in which they practice. 140 They must also research and
Family Lawyer, Witkin Summary of California Law, and Corpus Juris Secundum
(C.J.S.).
136 Id. at 593.
137 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 118, § 18:6 (identifying sixteen states that have
adopted the rule); see also Williams v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 607 N.W.2d 78, 84 (Mich.
2000) (holding that attorneys have an obligation to engage in reasonable research when
the law is unsettled); Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc. v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, 981 P.2d
236, 239 n.1 (Idaho 1999) (noting that at least thirteen jurisdictions had adopted the
"judgmental immunity rule" that where law is unsettled, an attorney is not liable for an
incorrect judgment if he engaged in reasonable research); Baird v. Pace, 752 P.2d 507,
510-511 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that even as to doubtful matters, an attorney is
expected to perform sufficient research to enable him to make an informed and intelligent
judgment on behalf of his client).
138 Farrar v. Mortimer, No. A104173, 2005 WL 2033339 at *11 (Cal. App. 2005) (finding
an attorney not liable in malpractice case where an expert testified that the defendant's
research notes revealed "extensive research" and consideration of the issues).
139 Clary v. Lite Machines Corp., 850 N.E.2d 423 (Ind. App. 2006) (affirming a
malpractice verdict where research validating the attorneys' tactical decisions was not
conducted until after the trial).
141 Stanley v. Richmond, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768, 781 (Ct. App. 1995) (stating that an
attorney can avoid liability by conducting "thorough, contemporaneous research" and
demonstrating "detailed knowledge of legal developments and debate in the field"); see
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understand the rules of the courts before which they practice. 14 1 The
number of sources a lawyer considers may also be a measure of the
reasonableness of the research. 142 Courts will also find lawyers negligent
for failing to find readily available existing authority. 143 Ultimately, the
standard for reasonable research is similar to that used in the ethics and
court-rules situations: research has been sufficient when it yields existing
sources that support the result being advocated.
II. A UNIFIED STANDARD
It is no great surprise that none of the avenues of assessing
research provides a clear standard for competent legal research. Legal
research is complex, and context-dependent. There are as many
approaches to research as different types of legal issues. It is virtually
impossible to articulate a clear, concrete standard to apply in all contexts.
Nonetheless, when viewed as a whole, the cases discussing ethical
standards, court rules, malpractice and ineffective assistance reveal a great
deal about the expectations of competent research.
A clear standard emerges from the various approaches to
determining competent research. When a lawyer has failed to provide the
court with relevant authority to support the result being advocated, the
court looks into the adequacy of the research process. Judges evaluate the
adequacy of the research in terms of whether they have been provided
with what they need to make an informed decision in the case before them,
and they evaluate the process based on their own, or expert witnesses'
perception of what is standard in the field. These two threads create a
standard that, while flexible, allows an analysis of whether today's legal
researcher must use the internet in order to avoid the negative
consequences of inadequate research.
144
also McGurk v. Stenberg, 58 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (D. Neb. 1997) (finding deficient
performance in a malpractice claim where counsel failed to find a case decided seven
months prior to trial).
141 See, e.g., Dixon Ticonderoga Co. v. Estate of O'Connor, 248 F.3d 151, 173 (3d Cir.
2001) (finding that under New Jersey law, a lawyer has a duty to research the statute of
limitations).
142 Aloy v. Mash, 696 P.2d 656, 657 (Cal. 1985) (finding a triable issue of negligence in a
malpractice claim where a lawyer relied on an incomplete reading of a single case rather
than "all the pertinent authorities, state and federal").
143 See, e.g., Haas v. Warren, 459 S.E.2d 255, 255 (N.C. 1995) (finding a triable issue of
negligence where lawyers reviewed statutory index but missed the relevant reference).
144 While no court has yet explicitly held that failure to use the internet for research is
grounds for sanctions or malpractice liability, scholars have periodically raised the issue.
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A. STANDARD RESEARCH TECHNIQUES
The question of what research techniques are standard is a difficult
one, since the answer varies depending on the vicissitudes of the
publishing industry, the development of technology, and individual
practice areas of the law. Scholars have noted that much greater attention
has been given to what lawyers find than how they find it. 145 Nonetheless,
there are ways to assess whether certain sources or techniques are
standard, and they all point towards electronic research. 1
46
There is little doubt that the internet has become a major tool in a
legal researcher's arsenal in the last two decades. 147 In spite of resistance
in certain quarters, 14 and legitimate concern about some of the pitfalls of
electronic research,149 it can safely be said that research via the internet
150
is a standard technique used by a majority of lawyers in a majority of
jurisdictions throughout the country.
In 2000, Michael Whiteman assessed whether electronic research
has become a standard research tool by considering whether lawyers can
charge clients for use of electronic tools and whether there is evidence that
judges and lawyers actually engage in electronic research. 151 As to the fee
145 See, e.g., Richard Danner, Contemporary and Future Directions in American Legal
Research: Responding to the Threat of the Available, 31 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 179, 184-
185 (2003) (noting that "we know very little about how lawyers go about their research").
141 See, e.g., Whiteman, supra note 8, at 92-103 (assessing the question whether the use
of Computer Assisted Legal Research and the Internet have become standard research
techniques).
147 The widespread use of the internet for legal research has been well documented. See,
e.g., Robert J. Howe, The Impact of the Internet on the Practice of Law: Death Spiral or
Never-Ending Work?, 8 VA. J. L. & TECH. 5, 16 (2003) (noting that for all practical
purposes, legal research has "migrated to the internet"); Christine Hurt, The Bluebook at
Eighteen: Reflecting and Ratifying Current Trends in Legal Scholarship, 82 IND. L.J. 49,
68 (2007) (noting that electronic sources represent the single biggest change in legal
research in the twenty-first century).
141 See, e.g., Ezra Dodd Church, Technological Conservatism: How Information
Technology Prevents the Law from Changing, 83 TEX. L. REv. 561 (2004); Ronald K. L.
Collins & David M. Skover, Communications Revolutions and Legal Culture, 27 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 637 (2002); Nazareth A. M. Pantaloni III, 1994 Call for Papers: Legal
Databases, Legal Epistemology, and the Legal Order, 86 LAW LIBR. J. 679 (1994).
149 See, e.g., Kris Gilliland, What Lawyers Need to Know About the Internet for Legal
Research, 705 PLI/PAT. 225 (2002); Molly Warner Lien, Technocentrism and the Soul of
the Common Lawyer, 48 AM. U. L. REv. 85 (1998); Lee F. Peoples, The Death of the
Digest and the Pitfalls of Electronic Research: What is the Modern Legal Researcher To
Do?, 97 LAW LIBR. J. 661 (2005).
150 In discussing the "internet," I refer not only to web-based legal research databases
such as Lexis and Westlaw, but also to the vast array of resources that can be accessed for
little or no cost via the World Wide Web.
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issue, Whiteman reasoned that if courts allowed attorneys to bill for
electronic research, it must be a standard technique. Using this rationale,
Lexis and Westlaw both meet the criterion for a standard research tool.1
52
Recent surveys of the practicing bar provide ample evidence that, not only
Lexis and Westlaw, but also the internet as a whole, are now widely used
by lawyers in their legal research efforts.
153
In 2006, the American Bar Association Legal Technology
Resource Center conducted a large-scale survey on the use of technology
in the legal profession. 154  The survey, with over 2500 respondents
covering a broad cross-section of lawyers from different firm sizes,
practice areas, and years of experience, reveals the extent to which online
research has become the norm. 155 The great majority of respondents
(9 3 %) conduct legal research online, and print was not selected as the
dominant format for accessing any of a number of common research
sources (for example, legal citators, federal case law, legislative and
administrative materials, state case and legislative materials, law reviews,
legal treatises, general news, etc.). 156
The survey results also show that lawyers are using the internet as
a whole, and not just Lexis and Westlaw. Forty-two percent of the survey
respondents reported starting their research with a fee-based service,
157
while twenty-five percent reported using a legal-specific search engine
158
and twenty-four percent start with a general search engine. 159 In addition,
151 Whiteman, supra note 8, at 92-95.
152 Id.
153 See 4 2006 LEGAL TECHNOLOGY RESOURCE CENTER SURVEY REPORT: ONLINE
RESEARCH (American Bar Association 2006) [hereinafter ABA SURVEY]; SANFORD N.
GREENBERG, ATTORNEY SURVEY 2007, BACK TO THE FUTURE OF LEGAL RESEARCH,
available at http://www.kentlaw.edu/academics/Irw/future/handouts/greenberg%/o20-
%20powerpoint.pdf; 2007 LIBRARIAN SURVEY, BACK TO THE FUTURE OF LEGAL
RESEARCH, available at
http://www.kentlaw.edu/academics/lrw/future/handouts/gaylord%/o2 0-
%20powerpoint.pdf; 2007 LEGAL RESEARCH E-SURVEY, BACK TO THE FUTURE OF LEGAL
RESEARCH, available at
http://www.kentlaw.edu/academics/lrw/future/handouts/mayer%/20powerpoint.pdf.
154 ABA SURVEY, supra note 153, at iv.
155 Id. at vi.
156 Id. at xiv-xvi.
157 Id. at xiv. Fee based services include Lexis and Westlaw.
15' Legal-specific search engines which can be accessed for free include sites such as
Findlaw.com and Lawguru.com.
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eighty-seven percent of respondents reported using free online resources at
some time during the research. 1
60
Other recent surveys reinforce the findings of the ABA study. A
2007 study of Chicago-area lawyers also showed that the majority of legal
research is conducted on-line, particularly through the use of Westlaw and
Lexis. 161 In a similar national study, over ninety percent of respondents
thought that attorneys must have access to and know how to use Westlaw
and Lexis. 162 A clear majority of respondents also indicated that tasks such
as case research and updating through Shepard's or KeyCite were best
done online. 163 These studies provide clear evidence that research on the
internet is not only standard, but the predominant method by which
lawyers in practice conduct legal research. 1
64
A final method of assessing whether a research technique is
standard is looking at whether it is being taught in law school and what
emphasis it is given to it. The great majority, if not all, law schools
include training in Lexis and Westlaw as part of their legal research and
writing curriculum. 165 Despite concerns about the effect of online legal
research on students' analytical abilities, 166 the trend has been to
incorporate more instruction in online research earlier in the semester.
167
160 The most widely used free services included Findlaw.com (39%), state bar association
websites (26%), other web sites (14%), and Cornell's Legal Information Institute (12%).
Id. at xv.
161 GREENBERG, supra note 153.
162 Patrick Meyer, 2007 Legal Research E-Survey,
http://www.kentlaw.edu/academics/lrw/future/handouts/meyer%/20powerpoint.pdf (last
visited Dec. 6, 2007).
163 Id. The same respondents did note, however, that tasks such as statutory and
secondary source research were better done in print.
164 The fact that many attorneys perceive that conducting case research online is more
efficient does not necessarily make it so. Many legal research experts have noted that
case research is very inefficient when conducted online because searches are limited to
key words and do not allow the researcher to find cases that are related in substance but
do not use the same terminology. See, e.g., Peoples, supra note 149, at 663-64
(reviewing the literature analyzing the limitations of electronic research).
165 See Ass'n Legal Writing Dirs., Legal Writing Inst., 2007 Survey Results 10-11 (2007),
available at http://alwd.org/surveys/survey results/2007 Survey Results.pdf (showing
that 112 schools give limited Westlaw/Lexis training in the first semester and ninety-
eight schools give unlimited training in the first semester).
166 See, e.g., Ian Gallacher, Forty-Two: The Hitchhiker's Guide to Teaching Legal
Research to the Google Generation, 39 AKRoN L. REv. 151 (2006); Lien, supra note 149.
16' For example, this year for the first time, many legal research and writing professors at
the Beasley School of Law at Temple University will be allowing full access to Westlaw
and Lexis from the start of the year as well as teaching students about various free online
legal research sources. For an account of one school's switch to integrating online
28
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As more members of the "Google Generation"' 16 8 graduate from law
school and enter the practice of law, and as print collections in law
libraries shrink while online databases grow, 169 use of the internet as the
primary tool of legal research will continue to increase.
While a lawyer's research methods reveal a great deal about the
competence of the research, the method of research is ultimately a
secondary inquiry, only engaged in when the results of that research
process is judged inadequate. A lawyer who provides the court with
adequate controlling authority is not going to be judged incompetent
whether she found that authority in print, electronically, or by any other
means. It is unlikely that a court considering a Rule 11 sanction or an
expert testifying in a malpractice case will even consider the research
method unless the lawyer has failed to provide sufficient support for the
result being advocated. That is where the real measure of adequate
research takes place.
B. PROVIDING ADEQUATE SUPPORT FOR THE RESULT BEING
ADVOCATED
As the review of the Model Rules, court rules, and malpractice and
ineffective assistance cases revealed, research is most often judged
inadequate when judges are not given what they need and what they know
can be found, in order to render a decision in a particular case. 17' This is
not to say that a lawyer must provide everything in a brief that a court
could use in the opinion. Lawyers will always make strategic choices
about what to include, and courts may well find other authorities to be
relevant. 17 1 Nonetheless, to avoid charges of incompetence, the lawyer
must provide enough support to justify the requested result, and the
competent lawyer should strive for more than the minimum. It would be
research into the curriculum, see Carrie W. Teitcher, Rebooting Our Approach to
Teaching Research: One Writing Program's Leap into the Computer Age (Brooklyn Law
Sch. Legal Studies, Paper No. 62, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-934688.
See also Thomas Keefe, Teaching Legal Research from the Inside Out, 97 LAw LIBR. J.
117 (2005) (advocating teaching electronic legal research before print research in order to
reflect the reality of the predominance of electronic research in practice).
168 The term "Google Generation" refers to the generation of students who have grown up
with computers and consider them integral to the academic setting. The average law
student falls into this category. Gallacher, supra note 166, at 163-64.
169 For a discussion of the reduction in print sources and expansion of online sources in
the law library, see Teitcher, supra note 167, at 15.
170 See supra Part I.
171 See William H. Manz, Citations in Supreme Court Opinions and Briefs: A
Comparative Study, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 267 (2002) (documenting the differences between
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extremely difficult, if not impossible, to provide today's judges with what
they need, or think they need, without using the internet as part of the
research process. A lawyer who fails to research on the web will not find
all of the relevant sources and will likely fall below the standard of
competence by any measure.
1. Legal Materials
First, and most obviously, judges expect to be provided with
current, controlling authority. While much legal authority can easily be
found through print research tools, judges recognize that using the internet
is the best way to make sure that information is up-to-date. Because
information can be uploaded to the internet and made available almost
instantaneously, changes in the law are much more accessible online than
in print sources and can be easily located. 172 A lawyer can no longer use
lack of time as an excuse for not being current on the law. 173 Case law has
long reflected judges' awareness of the increased availability of
information in modern times.
For example, in McNamara v. United States, an ineffective
assistance case, the court considered "whether, in this environment, it is
outside the wide range of reasonable conduct for a lawyer to fail to utilize
some method of keeping up with changes in the law."' 174 Although the
district court decision was ultimately reversed and remanded, the lower
court stated that "[o]ne consequence of this modern environment and of
dramatic advancements in technology is the advent of extensive resources
for staying abreast of developments in the law. Numerous legal
newspapers, periodicals such as United States Law Week, and on-line
services serve this important purpose."'175 Noting the advancements in
technology in the past twenty years, the court found that "[a]s technology
and resources develop, the minimum knowledge and preparation required
of lawyers develops as well."'
176
In this environment, a lawyer must use some form of web-based
research to make sure that all primary sources of law cited are up-to-date.
Because of the ease of posting digital information online, changes in the
law are now readily available instantaneously. 177 Court decisions are
172 Podboy, supra note 7, at 1182.
17 3 Id. at 1191.
174 867 F. Supp. 369, 374 (E.D. Va. 1994), rev'd, 74 F.3d 514 (4th Cir. 1996).
175 Id.
176 Id at 375 n.3.
177 Michelle M. Wu, Why Print and Electronic Resources Are Essential to the Academic
Law Library, 97 LAW LIB. J. 233, 248-49 (2005).
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posted online well in advance of appearing in print. 178 Shepard's on Lexis
or KeyCite on Westlaw are the fastest and most reliable ways for a lawyer
to ensure that a case has not been reversed or overruled. 179 The cases
indicate that judges are aware of these online services and expect lawyers
to use them. 80 There is no doubt that the internet has raised the standard
for competence in research when it comes to ensuring that a cited case is
current and has not been overruled or invalidated.
Likewise, statutory amendments and regulatory changes are posted
on Lexis and Westlaw, as well as on many government websites, well in
advance of print sources, and today's lawyers would be well-advised to
look for this information. The court in Whirlpool Financial Corp. v. GN
Holdings, Inc. recognized this over ten years ago, stating that "[i]n today's
society, with the advent of the 'information superhighway,' federal and
state legislation and regulations, as well as information regarding industry
trends, are easily accessed."' 8'1  The ease with which government
information can be accessed for free on the internet has raised judges'
expectations that they will be provided with the most recent controlling
sources. A lawyer who fails to use the internet to ascertain the most
current version of the law would certainly be considered deficient.
In addition, an increasing amount of primary legal material is
available only online. This is particularly true of state and federal
legislative and administrative material. 1 2  Because of the low cost of
digital publication, legislatures and administrative bodies are publishing
directly on their own websites, rather than using commercial publishers to
print and disseminate their work. 8 3 Several jurisdictions have begun to
178 Whiteman, supra note 8, at 100.
179 Wu, supra note 177, at 248. While neither KeyCite nor Shepard's is infallible, there is
currently no better option for making sure that a case to be cited has not received negative
treatment by a subsequent court.
180 See, e.g., U.S. v. Mack, 229 F.3d 226, 244 n.9 (3d Cir. 2000) (Becker, C.J.,
concurring) (reflecting a judge's use of KeyCite); Rivera v. Jeziosky, No. 03-CV-
830(M), 2007 WL 913990, at *4 n.3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2007) (noting the discrepancy
between Shepardizing on Lexis and KeyCiting on Westlaw for the same case); Cooper
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Farese, No. 3:02CV210-P-A, 2007 WL 108281, at *6 n.2 (N.D.
Miss. Jan. 9, 2007) (indicating the use of KeyCite in preparing opinion); Andreshak v.
Service Heat Treating Inc., 439 F. Supp. 2d 898, 901 n.2 (E.D. Wis. 2006) (indicating the
use of KeyCite in preparing the opinion); Gosnell v. Rentokil, 175 F.R.D. 508, 510 n.1
(N.D. Ill 1997) (noting the ease of updating via Lexis or Westlaw); Meadowbrook,
L.L.C. v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 120 n. Il (Utah 1998) (noting the speed with which
Shepardizing can be accomplished online).
18 67 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 1995).
182 Wu, supra note 177, at 252.
183 Whiteman, supra note 8, at 98 (quoting Peter W. Martin, The Internet: "Full and
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replace print sources with online databases. For example, ten states and
the District of Columbia currently "deem[] as official one or more of their
online primary legal resources" and five of these states "have declared the
online versions of legal resources a substitute for a print official
source." 184 These official resources are primarily administrative. New
Mexico has even created an online administrative code where a print
version never existed.1" 5
This trend of discontinuing print official resources and replacing
them with online versions will only continue.18 6 While law librarians and
others have raised concerns about the authenticity of official legal
materials found only on the internet, 18 7 today's reality is that the only way
to access these materials is by conducting research on the internet, either
through Westlaw, Lexis, or individual government websites. A lawyer
who fails to use the internet, particularly when researching administrative
issues, is likely to miss key sources that a judge would expect to see cited.
Particularly in the context of administrative practice, failure to research on
the internet could easily fall below the standard for competent research.
The final category of primary authority that judges are citing (and
presumably feel they need in order to render decisions) is unpublished
appellate opinions. "Unpublished opinions" is the misnomer for those
judicial opinions that have not been designated for publication in the
courts' official case reporters. 188 These opinions, while technically
unpublished, are widely available in a variety of online databases. Some
federal "unpublished" decisions have even been in print since 2001 in the
Federal Appendix. Citation to unpublished opinions has been quite
controversial. 189 Nonetheless, in 2007, Federal Rule of Appellate
a history of the federal government's transition to digital publication of the Federal
Register and Congressional Record, see MacLachlan, supra, note 34, at 637-43.
184 RICHARD J. MATTHEWS & MARY ALICE BAISH, STATE-BY-STATE REPORT ON
AUTHENTICATION OF ONLINE LEGAL RESOURCES 33 (2007), available at
http://www.aallnet.org/aallwash/authen rprt/authenfinalreport.pdf (last visited Dec. 6,
2007).
185 Id.
186 Mary Alice Baish, Assoc. Washington Affairs Rep., American Ass'n Law Libraries,
The Future of Primary Legal Resources on the Web, Presentation at the Back to the
Future of Legal Writing Conference 15 (May 18, 2007), available at
http://www.kentlaw.edu/academics/lrw/future/handouts/baish%/20powerpoint.pdf.
187 See, e.g., MATTHEWS & BAISH, supra note 184; Barger, supra note 11, at 438-42;
Robert C. Berring, Losing the Law: A Call to Arms, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 279 (2007).
181 Michael Hannon, A Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in the United States Courts
of Appeals, 3 J. PRAC. & PROCESS 199, 205-06 (2001).
189 See, e.g., Patrick J. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little: Explaining the Sturm und Drang
over the Citation of Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1429 (2005). This
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Procedure 32.1 went into effect, requiring the federal courts to allow
parties to cite unpublished decisions issued after January 1, 2007.
Likewise, the trend in the states has been to allow the citation of
unpublished opinions as precedent. 1
90
The trend towards citing unpublished opinions is driven in large
part by their ready availability and accessibility online. For the same
reasons, there is an increase in citations to unpublished opinions in judicial
opinions. 191 As judges continue to see unpublished opinions cited as
precedent in briefs, the number of citations in opinions will rise, and
competent lawyers will be expected to provide relevant "unpublished"
authority. Scholars and lawyers have already begun to note the possibility
of malpractice liability for failure to research unpublished opinions.
192
Because the majority of unpublished opinions are available only online,
lawyers will have to research online in order to avoid charges of
incompetence.
A final reason lawyers will have to turn to the internet for research
of primary authority is the economics of law publishing. At the same time
as access to electronic databases is getting cheaper, acquiring print
resources is getting more expensive. 193 Many academic and law firm
libraries are cutting back on their subscriptions to print materials. 194 This,
in conjunction with the growth of flat fee agreements with Lexis and
Westlaw and the plethora of free legal databases, will make it increasingly
Article does not begin to address the complex controversy over whether unpublished
opinions should be used as precedent or not but instead recognizes the reality that these
opinions are being used and considers the implications for competent research.
190 Melissa M. Serfass & Jessie Wallace Cranford, Federal and State Court Rules
Governing Publication and Citation of Opinions: An Update, 6 J. APP. PRACTICE &
PROCESS 349 (2004) (noting the growing number of states that allow citation of
unpublished opinions as authority of some kind).
'9' See Robert Timothy Regan, A Snapshot of Briefs, Opinions, and Citations in Federal
Appeals, 8 J. APP. PRAc. & PROCESS 321, 330-35 (2006); Suzanna Sherry, Logic Without
Experience: The Problem of Federal Appellate Courts, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 97, 137-
38 n.239 (2006) (noting an increase in use of unpublished opinions in appellate
decisions).
192 See, e.g., Thomas L. Fowler, Holding, Dictum... Whatever, 25 N.C. CENT. L.J. 139,
142 n. 11 (2003) (noting that attorneys may feel compelled to research unpublished
opinions with precedential value in order to avoid malpractice claims in light of a North
Carolina rule allowing citation of unpublished opinions); Donn Kessler, Citation and
Access are a Dangerous Precedent, ARIz. ATT'Y, June 2006, at 15 (noting that the failure
to research unpublished opinions may be malpractice in light of increase in rules allowing
their citation).
193 Catherine Sanders Reach, David Whelan, & Molly Flood, Feasibility and Viability of
the Digital Library in a Private Law Firm, 95 LAw LIBR. J. 369, 380 (2003).
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difficult for the legal researcher to locate in print all of the materials
necessary to conduct thorough legal research. For all of these reasons, the
competent legal researcher must turn to the internet in order to locate and
provide courts with the legal material necessary to support the results
being advocated.
2. Non-legal Materials
The "dramatically accelerating increase in the availability of non-
legal sources accessible through on-line information methods,"'
195
combined with courts' increasing willingness to cite these materials,
suggests that the standard for competence in legal research will soon
encompass these materials. Lawyers will need to go beyond primary and
secondary legal authority in order to provide judges with the tools they
need to render decisions. While it is unlikely that a judge today would
find that a lawyer fell below the minimum standard for competent research
by failing to research and cite non-legal materials, that day may be fast
approaching. Even more than with legal materials, many of the relevant
non-legal materials can be found more easily, and sometimes exclusively,
on the internet.
There has been a noticeable increase in judicial citation to non-
legal sources since the early 1990s. 196 This increase has been documented
in a number of studies. 197 While these studies do not consider the extent to
which the non-legal sources are being specifically relied on as authority,
198
there can be little doubt that their presence in opinions serves to reinforce
the courts' reasoning, and contribute to the precedential value of the cases.
A wide variety of non-legal sources are being cited, including
dictionaries, 199 news articles, 20 0 and academic journals in a variety of
disciplines.
20 1
195 Schauer & Wise, supra note 12, at 512-13.
'9' Id. at 497 (noting the dramatic increase in the Supreme Court's citation of non-legal
sources since 1990, while the overall number of citations has remained constant and the
overall pages of opinions has decreased).
197 See John J. Hasko, Persuasion in the Court: Nonlegal Materials in U.S. Supreme
Court Opinions, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 427 (2002) (reporting the results of a study of citations
to non-legal sources in Supreme Court opinions from 1989-1998); Manz, supra note 17 1,
at 286-89 (noting the regular appearance of citations to non-legal treatises and periodicals
in Supreme Court opinions for the October 1996 Term); Schauer & Wise, supra note 12
(documenting citations to various non-legal sources in multiple courts from the 1950s
through the mid-I 990s).
'9' See Schauer & Wise, supra note 12, at 513 (noting that their study did not consider
whether the non-legal material cited "in fact influenced the judges doing the citing,"
though the authors do not discount the possibility that these sources might have an effect
on the outcomes of cases).
199 Hasko, supra note 197, at 432 (noting an increase in citations to the dictionary in the
1990s).
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It is likely that the ease of access to information on the internet is
driving the increased citation to non-legal sources. 202  For example,
newspaper articles are easily accessed either directly on the internet, or
through legal search engines such as Lexis and Westlaw. 203 A legal
researcher is likely to come across these articles in the course of online
research and, seeing their relevance, cite them. This is reinforced by the
fact that, while citations to non-legal materials are on the rise overall,
citations to traditional print secondary sources, such as law reviews, legal
encyclopedias, and treatises are decreasing. 20 4 Of particular note is the
increase in citations to two sources-blogs and Wikipedia-that are
available only on the internet.
Among the growing legal resources available on the internet are
law blogs.2 °5 Blogs are an online resource covering a broad array of legal
subjects, from tips on maintaining a solo law practice to theoretical legal
scholarship. The American Bar Association Journal maintains a list of
over 1000 blogs written by lawyers. 20 6 Blogs are also increasingly popular
among law professors, as a place to engage in scholarly discussion about
the law.20 7 The blogs cover every legal topic imaginable, and judges are
clearly reading them and citing them in judicial opinions.20 8
200 Id. at 437; see also Melissa Jacoby, Negotiating Bankruptcy Legislation Through the
News Media, 41 Hous. L. REV. 1091, 1107 (2004) (noting the increase in courts' use of
news in judicial opinions); Schauer & Wise, supra note 12, at 505 (noting that citation to
newspapers accounted for a significant portion of the increase in citation to non-legal
materials since the early 1990s).
201 Hasko, supra note 197, at 441-53 (noting citations to political science materials,
medical publications, business-related materials, technology information, history,
psychiatry, religious studies, and others); Schauer & Wise, supra note 12, at 503.
202 Schauer and Wise, supra note 12, at 510.
203 Id. at 511.
204 Id. at 506-07.
205 Blogs (web logs) about the law, or "blawgs," are websites maintained by lawyers, law
professors, law students, and other legal commentators. See Blawg,
http://www.blawg.com/About.aspx (last visited Dec. 6, 2007). Some of the more well-
known blawgs include The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com; Balkinization,
http://balkin.blogspot.com; How Appealing, http://howappealing.law.com; Professor
Bainbridge.com, http://www.professorbainbridge.com; and Sentencing Law and Policy,
http://sentencing.typepad.com.
206 Blawg Directory, http://www.abajournal.com/blawgs (last visited Dec. 6, 2007)
207 Welcome to Law Professor Blog, http://www.lawprofessorblogs.com (last visited Dec.
6, 2007).
20' There are currently two online studies of legal citations to blogs. See Ian Best, Cases
Citing Blogs Updated List,
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The number of citations to blogs, while relatively small, is
remarkable given the relative newness of blogs. The earliest citations to
blogs date back a mere three years to 2004.209 The citations appear
primarily in federal court decisions, including those of the U.S. Supreme
Court, 2 1 though, in the last year the number of state courts citing blogs
has increased.21' While the cases appear to cite blogs for a variety of
reasons, judges do not appear to be heavily relying on blogs as authority
for the decision being rendered. Thus, it is unlikely that failure to research
in blogs would currently fall below the standard for competent research.
Nonetheless, a lawyer seeking to rise above the minimum level of
competence should consider this type of research.
A similar, and possibly more disturbing, trend is the growing
number of citations to Wikipedia, the "online free-content encyclopedia
that anyone can edit."212 Since 2004, when two cases cited Wikipedia, the
number has steadily increased, with eight cases in 2005, forty-four cases
in 2006, and seventy-three cases between January and November of
2007. 213 Judges appear to be turning to Wikipedia for definitions, as well
as background information for a wide variety of topics.214 The majority of
Dec. 6, 2007) (documenting twenty-seven cases citing blogs thirty-two times through
August 6, 2006); Dave Hoffman, Court Citation of Blogs: Updated 2007 Study,
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/07/court citation.html (last visited
Dec. 6, 2007) (noting sixteen additional citations to blogs from August, 2006 through
July, 2007).
209 Best, supra note 208 (noting nine citations to blogs in 2004).
210 See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 278 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
211 See Hoffman, supra note 208 (listing Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young,
906 A.2d 168, 195 n.75 (Del. Ch. 2006); In re Tyson Foods, 919 A.2d 563, 593 n.77
(Del. Ch. 2007); State v. Foster, 845 N.E.2d 470, 478 n.3 (Ohio 2006)).
212 Wikipedia: Overview FAQ, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:OverviewFAQ
(last visited Dec. 6, 2007).
213 These numbers were determined by searching Westlaw's Allfeds/Allstates database
for "Wikipedia" with the relevant date restrictions and then filtering out cases in which
Wikipedia was mentioned, but not relied upon to support any proposition.
21 Some recent cases citing Wikipedia demonstrate the range of information cited. See,
e.g., Boim v. Fulton County School Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 983 (1 1th Cir. 2007) (citing
Wikipedia for the number of school shootings in the years preceding the incident
underlying the appeal); Lands Council v. McNair, 494 F.3d 771, 785 (9th Cir. 2007)
(Smith, C.J. specially concurring) (citing Wikipedia for background information on an
author relied on by majority); Sedrakyan v. Gonzalez, 237 F. App'x 76, 77 (6th Cir.
2007) (citing Wikipedia for geographical information); Courtney v. Halleran, 485 F.3d
942, 943-44 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Wikipedia for historical information); Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Comm'r, 484 F.3d 731, 732 n.1 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Wikipedia for the
definition of "accrual"); Matthews v. Ishee, 486 F.3d 883, 894 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing
Wikipedia for an explanation of "sarcasm").
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cases citing Wikipedia are from the federal courts, but state courts are
well-represented as well.215
The citations to blogs, Wikipedia, and other non-legal (and legal)
information on the internet have raised valid concerns. 216 The
impermanence of the internet, as content is modified and/or migrates to
other locations, means that a citation to a URL today may not lead to the
exact same information tomorrow.2 17  For example, if a judge cites a
Wikipedia entry in an opinion by using the URL, and the entry is
subsequently modified, the reader of the opinion who tries to access the
entry will not get the same information the judge relied on. In addition,
reliability, authoritativeness, and accuracy are all important concerns,
since there is often no way to know anything about the author of internet
content, or be assured that the information has not been tampered with.218
In spite of these concerns, the evidence is clear that courts are
increasingly relying on, and citing non-legal sources on the internet. The
practicing lawyer must recognize this reality and respond accordingly.
This means moving beyond the confines of traditional legal research
sources and searching for relevant non-legal information.
CONCLUSION
The complex, ever changing nature of the law and legal research
make it difficult to articulate a concrete standard for competence in legal
research. Nonetheless, the review of ethical rules, court rules, and
malpractice and ineffective assistance claims reveals some guiding
principles. The competent lawyer must, first and foremost, provide courts
with current, accurate authority to support the result being advocated. If a
lawyer does not provide the court with this authority, the court is likely to
investigate the lawyer's research process. The investigation will focus on
whether the lawyer employed standard research techniques in an attempt
to locate relevant, controlling authority. If the lawyer did not engage in
standard research techniques, negative consequences ranging from public
embarrassment to sanctions will follow.
The challenge for the modem attorney is that both research
techniques and judges' expectations are continually evolving. The rapid
pace of developing technology has meant that both methods for locating
authority and the nature of that authority have changed. The low cost of
215 Of the forty-four cases from 2006, see text accompanying note 214, supra, twenty-six
were from federal courts and eighteen were from state courts.
216 See generally Barger, supra note 11; David H. Tennant & Laurie M. Seal, Judicial
Ethics and the Internet: May Judges Search the Internet in Evaluating and Deciding a
Case?, PROF. LAW., Spring 2005, at 2.
217 Barger, supra note 11, at 439.
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digital publishing, combined with the ease of distribution over the internet,
has created "vast repositories of free legal information," 219 easily
accessible with a few keystrokes. Its very accessibility is leading lawyers
and judges to use the internet, and the sources found there, with increasing
frequency. While this creates great possibilities, it has also raised the bar
with regard to the expectations for legal research.220
Thus, while online databases have made it easier to locate current
material, today's lawyer is faced with higher expectations and a broad
array of sources to choose from. As the boundaries of legal and non-legal
information become murkier, a competent lawyer must research in both
arenas to provide clients and courts with all of the information needed to
make a decision. At the same time, the researcher must be aware of the
pitfalls of internet research, including reliability and impermanence.
Despite these concerns, the expectations of competent research should
include a review of relevant online material. Those judges and attorneys
who resist citation to online material will not be able to do so much
longer.
As technology continues to change, so too will the standard for
competence in legal research. While the minimum threshold for
competence may be a moving target, all lawyers should strive for more
than bare competence. As the expectations for relevant, up-to-the-minute
legal and non-legal sources rise, any lawyer hoping to avoid public
embarrassment in a judicial opinion, sanctions, or worse, should
understand that legal research involves a review of relevant online
resources. Research on the internet is no longer a luxury; it is a necessity.
219 Barger, supra note 11, at 424.
220 See generally MacLachlan, supra note 34.
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